Ukraine called it Operation Spider Web, a sweeping overnight drone assault deep inside Russia. More than 100 drones struck airbases across five time zones, damaging or destroying dozens of warplanes, including long-range strategic bombers.
Military analysts say the strike, launched in the early hours of June 1, 2025, is a wake-up call — not just for Russia, but for the world. It showed how accessible, low-cost technology, coupled with sharp strategy, can deliver devastating precision from hundreds of miles away.
In the days that followed, the how began to emerge: trailers filled with explosive-laden drones were quietly transported to highways near Russian airbases, hauled by unsuspecting civilian truckers. At the right moment, a hatch opened. The drones burst into the night sky — on a pre-planned trajectory straight for Russian bombers.
But what remained a mystery was how Ukrainian drone pilots — operating from within Ukraine’s own territory — were able to maintain control over drones so far behind enemy lines.
Yaniv Benbenisti, President and Chief Product Officer of Israeli counter-drone firm D-FEND Solutions, believes he’s cracked the code.
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"The truck was able to provide a very stable communication back to Ukraine, based on cellular communication," Benbenisti told Scripps News. “When you analyze the airbase, you see very good cellular reception on the highway — away from the base itself.”
Ukrainian forces used the trucks as relay points, maintaining radio communication with the drones while avoiding Russia’s attempts to jam signals near its bases.
Ukraine even released video of the trailer self-destructing after the drones launched. "That makes sense," Benbenisti said, “because once the mission is over, you want to destroy any evidence of the tech that was installed."
Among that tech: a system that let the drones switch to autopilot after launch, flying on pre-programmed paths to the targets. So even if GPS was jammed, the drones could keep going.
When they got close enough, Ukrainian pilots re-established control — indicated by a “no fail” mode flashing on their screens—and manually steered the drones into the bombers’ fuel tanks.
“They aren’t hiding the fact they used ArduPilot,” I noted to Benbenisti, referencing the open-source autopilot software popular among DIY drone makers. “I imagine they customized it.”
"Actually, not much," he replied. “It’s a very straightforward use of commercial tech.”
In other words, the strike didn’t require classified tools or billion-dollar weapons systems. Just some clever code. A trailer. And a plan.
"That’s why this is so interesting," I said. "It’s not enough to block GPS. Not enough to jam cell service. It’s not going to cut it anymore."
"Exactly," Benbenisti said. “All these traditional countermeasures are useless when you’re dealing with small, low-cost flying objects that aren’t relying on GPS."
So what can be done?
"We look at the communication link between the drone and the pilot’s ground station," he explained. "That’s the weak point."
And that’s where firms like D-FEND come in — with hardware designed to sever the video link pilots depend on for precision strikes. This was covered by Scripps News’ Liz Landers.
"No feed, no strike," I said.
"Unless..." Benbenisti replied.
Unless the drone doesn’t need a feed. Unless facial recognition and autonomous targeting are built into the drone itself.
"It just needs to get close enough,” he said. “Then it can pinpoint the person."
In that case, I asked, what’s the defense?
"At that point," he said, “it’s probably too late.”
So, should Operation Spider Web be seen as a wake-up call?
"Absolutely," Benbenisti said. “This tech won’t stay in Ukraine and Russia. It’s available to you, me, anyone. A few thousand dollars is all it takes to carry out a very severe attack.”
